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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
, Estimates from the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) indicate that between 6.5 million and 33 million Americans 
are affected annually with food-borne illnesses caused by pathogens in the food 
supply (Roberts and van Ravenswaay, 1989). These figures comprise between 3 
percent and 14 percent of the U.S. population; further, approximately 9,000 of these 
cases result in death annually (Bennett, Holmberg, Rogers, and Solomon, 1987). In 
contrast, data provided by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates 
that there are only 6,000 cancer cases, or 2 cases per 100,000 persons, which are 
caused by foods contaminated by pesticides annually (USEPA, 1987), 
The risks to human health from food contaminations can be largely divided into 
three causes: chemical residues, natural poisons, and pathogenic microorganisms. 
Chemical residues in food include examples such as alar in red apples; cyanide in 
Chilean grapes; dioxin in milk; antibiotics and other animal drugs in meat; lead used 
in the past to solder and seal cans for food storage; pesticides in fruits and 
vegetables. These and other contaminants have potential effects on food 
contamination and safety if the food is for human consumption. Natural poisons 
include products such as anatoxin in corn and peanuts (CAST, 1989). 
Food-borne illnesses can also be caused by pathogenic microorganisms; i.e., by 
microbial toxins produced in the food before consumption {Staphylococcal and 
Botulinum toxins, for example); by infection with bacteria that produce toxins during 
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their growth in the alimentary canal {Clostridium perfringens. Bacillus cereus)', and by 
infection from microorganisms or parasites that establish themselves in the alimentary 
canal or other parts of the body {Brucella, Coxiella, Trichinella, etc.). 
In general, pathogenic microorganisms present greater threats to the food 
supply than do chemical residues or natural poisons. Microbiological agents caused 
90 percent of the food-borne ilhiesses in the United States from 1983 to 1987 (CDC, 
1990). 
These pathogens, which tend to be widely distributed in the world, are found in 
the bacterial generSiSalmonella, Escherichia, Clostridium, Bacillus, Staphylococcus, 
Streptococcus, Shigella, Vibrio, Brucella, Yershinia, etc. 
Salmonella is a significant problem among the microbes, affecting an estimated 
one third (35%) of the chicken carcasses after slaughter (Green, 1987; Newsweek, 
1989b). Some feel that food handlers and consumers underestimate the effects and 
level of microbial contamination and resulting food-borne illnesses. The risk of food 
contamination and associated illnesses from agents such as Salmonella can be 
controlled to a large degree through proper rinsing and preparation. Also, any 
microbial toxins can be destroyed through proper cooking. However, some microbial 
toxins such as Staphylococcal poison can not be eliminated by heating. 
The ideal method of preventing the entry of pathogens into food requires the 
application of hygienic measures all along the food production chain: processing, 
storage, distributions and serving. However, for this there are costs as well as 
benefits. The cost of continuously sanitizing the entire production environment with 
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a continuous evaluation of conditions can be costly. These costs need to be 
compared to economic losses resulting from disease. 
Food-bome diseases cause large economic losses for society annually. These 
costs include items such as medical costs, productivity loss, pain and suffering to 
individuals, food industry losses, and losses within the public health sector (Roberts 
and van Ravenswaay, 1989). Estimated losses, based largely on an evaluation of 
direct individual losses, have been presented in congressional testimony to be 
approximately $1 billion a year for salmonellosis, another $1 billion a year for 
campylobacteriosis, and $215 million to $323 million for congenital toxoplasmosis 
(Roberts and van Ravenswaay, 1989). These estimates have included direct costs 
such as hospitalization costs. However, they likely represent an underestimation of 
the true economic costs because costs were not computed for willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) to reduce the probability of illness. 
The primary focus of this study is to estimate consumer WTP for enhanced food 
safety. To accomplish this, a nonhypothetical laboratory experimental approach was 
developed to measure individual WTP to avoid food-borne illness. The experimental 
design uses a Vickrey (1961) second-price sealed-bid auction to elicit consumer WTP 
for enhanced food safety. Five food-borne pathogens are evaluated: Campylobacter, 
Salmonella, Staphylococcus aureus, Clostridium perfringens, and Trichinella spiralis. 
This research also explores how consumers' naive WTP bids respond when 
consumers are provided information about the objective probability of contamination 
and the specific health impacts of alternative food-borne pathogens. The paper 
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reports and explains the often-observed divergences in WTP and willingness to accept 
(WTA) measures when measuring nonmarket goods such as food safety. From a 
public policy perspective, the most important feature of this study involves the 
estimate of the value to consumers of enhanced safety of the food supply. 
Explanation of Dissertation Format 
The format of this dissertation follows the Iowa State University alternate 
dissertation format. This dissertation consists of three papers or sections. Each 
section represents a manuscript that will be submitted to a professional economic 
journal. Therefore, the format of each section, especially tables, figures, and 
references, follows the format of the journal to which it has been or will be 
submitted. Each section is self-contained with the traditional introduction, discussion 
areas, summary conclusion, and references. References cited in the general 
introduction and general summary and discussion sections are included in the 
literature cited section. 
The author conducted the laboratory experiments and performed data and 
statistical analysis upon which each manuscript is based. Each section was written in 
consultation with Dr. James Kliebenstein, Dr. Dermot Hayes, and Dr. Jason Shogren. 
This research work is supported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food 
Safety Consortium. 
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SECTION I. 
AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO MEASURING 
THE VALUE OF SAFER FOOD 
6 
INTRODUCTION 
There is an optimal level of societal expenditures on food safety. In the 
absence of any public goods problem this should equal the sum of each individual's 
optimal expenditures. One measure of the individual's optimal expenditures is his or 
her willingness to pay (WTP) for safer food. Alternatively, one could estimate how 
much individuals need to compensate for unsafe food. 
The value of having estimates of the measures discussed above is the guidance 
they would provide to those who must determine how much to spend on the safety of 
the food supply. Existing food safety expenditures in the United States are 
determined in part by the government's interpretation of signals sent by consumers 
via direct contact, interest groups, and the media. Many of those who participate in 
this process lack information on existing expenditures on food safety as well as the 
incidence rate or probability of becoming ill from a particular pathogen or chemical 
contaminant. 
Due to the lack of information consumers have underestimated the foodbome 
risk from the pathogenic microorganisms which are primary cause of foodbome 
illness and more serious than the chemical or pesticide hazards (Roberts and van 
Ravenswaay 1989). This estimation process is supplemented by research and 
testimony on existing hospitalization costs and the opportunity cost of time spent 
away from work (Roberts 1985, 1989). 
Previous estimate of foodbome illness costs have ranged from $4.8 billion 
(Roberts 1989) to $8.4 billion (Todd 1989), to a high of $23 billion (Gartright et al. 
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1988) which represents a broad estimate for intestinal infectious diseases. However, 
it is well known that this cost of illness approach or human capital method (see 
Linnerooth 1979) underestimates the true cost of the problem because the individuals 
involved would presumably pay more than the actual costs incurred. 
The absence of any information in the United States has created a situation 
where the general public and the media request continuing improvements in the 
safety of the food supply. Any further decrease in the incidence rate of pathogens in 
the United States will come in at an increasing cost, an interesting question therefore 
is at what point the cost will exceed the benefits. To answer this questions, van 
Ravenswaay (1988) reviewed the limited literature about the consumers demand of 
food safety. This survey paper summarized what is known about consumers' concerns 
and who has the responsibility about food safety and suggested the methodological 
approaches to obtain this information. Van Ravenswaay emphasized the key 
question in food safety research has been individuals' WTP for risk or exposure 
reductions, and concluded with " We know nothing about the demand for food safety 
and...." that the more research were needed to find the knowledge of consumers' 
concerns and the methods of evaluating the WTP values about food safety. 
To the author's knowledge, no scientific method has yet been implemented to 
measure sickness costs. This is despite the need for this estimate from those involved 
in lawsuits where illness has occurred as well as those who are responsible for 
expenditures on food safety. The absence of any estimates illness (or morbidity) costs 
in the literature is understandable. Individuals themselves may have difficulty putting 
a monetary value on sickness and it is not surprising that others would feel 
uncomfortable aggregating across such uncertain estimates. 
One way to measure these costs and benefits would be to survey consumers 
directly. Mitchell and Carson (1989) provide a good overview of the this contingent 
valuation methods used to estimate values when the item in question does not have a 
price. Regardless of how well these surveys are designed, however, respondents know 
that they are responding to a hypothetical situation. Penner et al. (1985) conducted 
food safety survey which have broad questions about consumers willingness to pay for 
safety label in meat product. Seventy-one percent of the respondents would pay 
slightly more or considerably more for the safety information. Slightly more than 
one-fourth (28 percent) were willing to pay more than 3 cents per pounds of meat 
products. Consequently, the results are too general to use as a indicator of 
consumers food safety concern. 
Recently, an alternative to the survey based methodology has been developed. 
This experimental approach attempts to force participants to concentrate better on 
the question by simulating real world decisions in a laboratory environment (Smith 
1982). Previous studies to estimate willingness to pay for reducing the foodbome risk 
directly applied to the laboratory experiment approach were not found in the 
literature. However, laboratory experiments are often used to test the principles of 
economic theory (Kahneman et al. 1990) or to induce the valuation in environmental 
economics and public good provision (Brookshire and Coursey 1987). The valuation 
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experiment of nonmarket good such as visibility (Rowe et al. 1980) were 
implemented in the hypothetical settings. 
One exception was the work by Coursey, Hovis and Schulze (1987), who 
conducted a survey and series of experiment in nonhypothetical setting to examine 
the disparity of the WTP measure to avoid and willingness to accept (WTA) measure 
to endure an unpleasant taste experience. WTP value were asked to subjects with 
description of the bitter taste, but harmless chemical on SOA (sucrose octa-acetate) 
in survey, not tasting of SOA. Also, they conducted the experiment to elicit the 
individual bids in a Vickrey (1961) auction setting. The fifth-price sealed-bid auction 
with iteration was used as a demand revealing mechanism. They concluded that 
there was not a significant disparity between two values from the experiments. 
Subjects of experiment had a chance to taste the SOA before their bidding for WTP 
and WTA, they were bidding the values with the certain consequence of auction 
outcomes. This study was nonhypothetical in the sense that those whose bids were 
not accepted were required to swallow a small amount of SOA to receive the 
compensation that was agreed upon. 
Before this experiment, Knetsch and Sinden (1984) also examined the disparity 
of two values with choice of uncertain outcome of lottery tickets. This experiment 
used the one shot experiment instead of Vickrey auction mechanism. Most of their 
results suggested that the selling lottery was less traded than the buying lottery, i.e., 
willingness to accept measures were greater than the willingness to pay measures. 
However, Coursey et al. criticized the Knetsch and Sinden's experiment results. 
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Their disparity of the two values was attributed to the uncertainty in experiment 
design where this uncertainty could cause the preference reversal phenomenon in 
monetary bidding procedure and to the use of one shot experiment instead of Vickrey 
auction-an efficient demand-revealing mechanism. The food safety experiment are 
based on these nonhypothetical setting with certainty of the choice to reduce the 
foodbome risk in Vickrey auction setting. 
In this paper we use this experimental approach to measure how much 
individuals would be wiling to pay to remove existing levels of food-borne pathogens 
from a particular meal. In designing the experiments described below, we took great 
pains to convince participants that one sandwich had a greater probability of being 
contaminated than a more expensive alternative. The hope was that by using real 
risks and real money the participants would be forced to concentrate on the trade-off 
between risks and returns and in so doing provide a more accurate value. Such 
isolation of food-bome risk and human behavior in food safety experiment by 
controlling the noise from the enviroiunent infers the value of WTP precisely 
(Hoffman and Spitzer 1985). 
Another advantage of using nonhypothetical food safety experiment is that the 
lab experiment can be used as a source of data. The lack of information in food 
safety area is not easily able to perform the theory-intensive approach such as 
demand-based method and hedonic price method. However, the observation-based 
experimentation provides the data such as true economic costs of food safety and are 
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relatively inexpensive method compared to the collection of new data from the 
market (Hoffman and Spitzer 1985). 
One additional benefit of this experimental approach is that we could directly 
measure the monetary value of increasing the safety of the U.S. food supply without 
first estimating risk aversion and the monetary value of a bout with illness. In the 
methodology used, participants perform their own multiplication of probability and 
pay-off. 
The experimental methodology used here has some drawbacks. In particular, it 
is unclear how far one can generalize the results. Also, it is unclear how group 
composition and group dynamics influence the experimental results. A secondary 
purpose of this paper is to examine the sensitivity of the experimental results to 
changes in the reported probabilities and changes in the composition of the groups 
themselves. The literature on nonhypothetical experiments is still in its infancy. The 
results presented in this paper contribute by providing heretofore unreported 
measures of errors induced by group dynamics and the extent to which participants in 
nonhypothetical group auctions behave in a rational manner. 
The first section of the paper describes ten experiments each with 
approximately 15 participants that were performed to measure WTP and WTA for 
the five most common food-borne pathogens in the United States. The second 
section describes a follow-up experiment where we changed (a) only the people in 
each group (trials 1 through 10), and (b) the reported risks associated with the less 
safe food (trials 11 through 20), and (c) the name of foodborne pathogens to a 
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generic foodborne pathogens (one experiment). The last section draws from the 
experimental analysis and those results which are useful for policy analysts and for 
others who may wish to run nonhypothetical experiments. 
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EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
In each of the ten experiments described in this section, approximately 15 
individuals were paid to participate in a Vickrey second-price sealed-bid auction. 
The first five experiments attempted to estimate individual WTP for a safe food, and 
the second attempted to measure how much one had to pay individuals to eat (WTA) 
a potentially unsafe food. Appendix 1 contains a sample instruction brochure. 
We began by aimouncing to several nonintersecting classes of undergraduate students 
that an experiment providing an approximate stipend of $18.00 and a "free lunch" was 
scheduled and that volunteers were requested to sign up. Fifteen participants and 
two alternatives were chosen from each class and asked to appear at an on-campus 
taste-testing room. This taste-testing room is regularly used to measure reactions to 
experimental products developed at a nearby facility. 
The benefits of using Vickrey's second-price sealed-bid auction (Vickrey 1961) 
are that each participant submits a bid equal to his/her actual value, independent of 
the other bidders' behaviors, and that truth is the dominant strategy (Cox et al. 1982). 
Furthermore, the auction iteration process allows the learning effects to participants 
and the revelation of their true preference (value) to auctioned items (Coursey 1987). 
In each experiment, fifteen participants were first familiarized with the 
experimental procedure with a candy bar auction. Participants were given a small 
candy bar and told to bid for a larger candy bar. It was made clear that the student 
whose bid was successful would pay the monetary bid and get the larger candy bar. 
We e:cplained that we wished to measure how much they were willing to pay to 
upgrade their candy bar. 
The candy bar experiment had five trials. In each trial, participants with $3 
initial income wrote down their bids and these bids were collected by one of three 
monitors who then made public the first-highest bidder and second-highest bids. At 
the end of the fifth bidding trial, one of the trials was randomly selected to be 
binding. In this binding trial, the second-highest bid was used. The individual 
responsible for this bid paid the bid amount and upgraded his or her candy bar. 
Next, participants were shown two meat sandwiches. We explained that one 
had been stringently screened for pathogens. The second experimental product was 
described as having a typical chance of contamination with one of the five most 
common food-borne pathogens in the United States: Campylobacter, Salmonella, 
Staphylococcus aureus, Trichinella spiralis, and Clostridium perfringens. The 
descriptions used in each case are presented in Appendix 2. 
Participants were asked to bid to upgrade to the safer sandwich. It was made 
clear that, with the exception of the individual whose bid was ultimately selected, all 
other bidders would be required to eat one of the experimental sandwiches or forfeit 
the $15 provided. After ten trials of bidding, participants were provided information 
on the odds of being contaminated from consuming the experimental food and a 
description of the food-borne illness. The probabilities provided were those for a 
typical U.S. consumer becoming ill from that particular pathogen for one meat-based 
meal and were therefore quite accurate. These odds are presented in Table 1. A 
15 
further ten bid trials followed the introduction of this information. After all 20 trials 
had been completed, one binding trial was randomly selected, as before. 
The five WTA experiments were identical except that 14 stringently-screened 
sandwiches and one test product were used. In this case we measured how much we 
had to pay someone to eat the test product. The differences in the instruction 
brochures are indicated with [ ] in Appendix 1. 
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EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Willingness to Accept 
Figure 1 shows the average WTA results by trial and by pathogen. These data 
are summarized and compared to the equivalent WTP values in Table 2. The 
average WTA values of all five pathogen experiments significantly exceed the average 
of WTP values in all inexperienced one-shot bids (trial 1), naive bids (trials 7 through 
10), and informed bids (trials 17 through 20). The Salmonella experiment is the 
extreme case. The average WTA value of the inexperienced one-shot bid is more 
than thirteen thousand times greater than the average WTP value. Even with 
repeated exposure to the auction market in naive bids and with detailed information 
of the food-borne illness in informed bids, the divergence between WTP and WTA 
values remained significant. We include these WTA values for comparison; however, 
it is likely that these values are overestimates for the following reasons. 
1. From Prospect theory, we know that the shape of value function is generally 
concave for gains (safer food) and convex for losses (less safe food) and that from 
any reference point the slope for losses is steeper than that for the gains (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979). Subjects asked an extremely high WTA value (compensation) to 
give up the screened food they had already acquired because health risk is not easily 
substitutable for money (see Hanemann 1991 and Shogren et al. 1991). 
2. The WTP measure is more appropriate and accurate than the WTA measure 
for public goods in valuation settings because the degree of loss aversion is sensitive 
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to the existence of nonmarket or market-like enviroimients (Brookshire and Coursey 
1987). 
3. For our purposes, these WTA values can be regarded as the cost to society 
of reintroducing pathogens into a previously safe world, whereas the WTP values are 
the benefits of eliminating pathogens from the existing U.S. food supply. 
4. In these WTA experiments, all but one of the participants ate the 
stringently-screened food, whereas in the WTP experiments, only one participant ate 
the "safer" food. One would imagine that, as the more risk-averse individuals bid 
against each other for the one safe sandwich, the WTP bids would be higher than the 
WTA bids; yet the opposite was the case. In all cases, the WTA bids were 
significantly higher (see Table 3). This phenomenon has been observed by others 
(Knetsch and Sinden 1982; Coursey et al. 1987). 
5. For policy purposes, the WTP bids are more useful because the WTA bids 
were probably inflated because participants asked for large monetary values in hopes 
of making more than the promised $15.00, whereas in the WTP case participants had 
to provide the cost and were more careful with their bids. Also, the WTP bids 
measured the benefits of reducing pathogens from today's levels, whereas the WTA 
measure implicitly assumes a world where food-borne pathogens have all but been 
eliminated and then measures the welfare loss of reintroducing pathogens. The WTP 
and WTA results are very different. For these reasons, we will focus on the WTP 
results. 
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Willingness to Pay 
Figure 2 shows the average bid for trials 1 through 20 for each of the pathogens 
for each of the WTP experiments. The averages for the first bid are similar to those 
one would receive from a survey that was answered truthfully and without 
information. Bids in trials 2 through 10 allow for the gaming and informational flow 
of the auction process. Information on the probability and nature of food-borne 
illness was introduced in trial 11, and increased the average bid for all pathogen cases 
of WTP. In trials 1 through 10, individuals were told that the test product had a 
typical chance of being contaminated, whereas in trials 11 through 20, individuals 
knew the actual probability. 
The average WTP for Staphylococcus aureus in trials 1 through 10 was greater 
than that for the other pathogens, possibly because of a lack of familiarity with this 
name. When information about the true probability and nature of the food-borne 
illness was introduced, average bids increased in all cases. The increase was 
particularly large for Campylobacter. The results for trials 17 through 20 are most 
useful for policy. The bids reflect information obtained after the bidding process had 
settled down. These figures tell us that the typical participant would be willing to pay 
between 42(5 and 86c per meal to reduce the probability of food-borne illness caused 
by the presence of each pathogen to the true odds of 1 in 100 million. 
Table 3 compares the mean of trials 7 through 10 with the mean of trials 17 
through 20. The t-test and signed-rank test indicate that the WTP differences 
between naive and experienced bids for Salmonella and Clostridium perfringens were 
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statistically significant at the 1 percent significance level. The mean differences in 
Campylobacter and Staphylococcus aureus were statistically significant at the 5 percent 
significance level, and Trichinella spiralis was significant at 10 percent significance 
level. It indicates that subjects' bids of the each experiment were responded to the 
information provided at trial 11. 
Table 3 also compares the prior subjective probability of contamination from 
the subjects' questionnaires with the true probability provided in trial 11. 
Interestingly, the provision of the true probability increased WTP when this 
probability was greater than the subjective probability in Campylobacter, Salmonella, 
and Trichinella spiralis experiments and decreased WTP when the opposite was the 
case in Clostridium perfringens. Figure 4 has the results of closer analysis of the value 
of information and the subjects' behaviors exposed to the repeated auction market. 
AT trial 11, subjects bids were jumped by large amount from trial 10. Even 
Staphylococcus aureus and Clostridium perfringens experiment bids were increased. 
Compared to the trial 20, their bids were decreased by 140 and 20c lower than the 
trial 10. Only Salmonella and Campylobacter experiments are statistically significant 
in difference between trial 10 and 11, in which the experiments with subjective 
probability were lower than the actual. At trial 20, after experiencing the repeated 
market exposure, bids were lower than the trial 10 and in Clostridium perfringens 200 
lower than the trial 10. The value of information were realized quite high in every 
trial 11. However, subjects responded to the repeated auction market with lower bids 
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based on their subjective probabilities. Overall, full information and repeated 
exposure to the auction market had an impact on average WTP values. 
If one believed that the results for trials 17 through 20 accurately reflect the 
participants' WTP to eliminate each of the pathogens, then consumer WTP to 
eliminate all five pathogens would be the sum of the individual bids for each 
pathogen. It is not immediately clear, however, that participants were responding in 
such a logical manner. For example, for Clostridium perfringens the true odds (i.e., 
those reported for trial 11) were 1 in 26 million^ and yet participants were willing to 
pay about 420. This WTP value is lower than those for the other pathogens, but not 
by an amount commensurate with the odds. This may be true because some 
participants ignored the information provided and/or because the presence of any 
risk, no matter how small, decreased the utility of the product. 
For trials 7 through 10, the maximum of the mean bids was 920 (for 
Staphylococcus aureus), whereas the minimum was 440 (for Salmonella). For trials 17 
through 20, the maximum was 860 (for Camplyobacter) and the minimum was 420 
(for Clostridium perfringens). This range in mean values is much less than one would 
have expected, given the differences in the nature of the pathogens and the large 
differences in the probability of infection. This lack of response to specific measures 
of risk is somewhat troubling and may indicate that participants were responding to 
the presence of risk rather than to the level of risk. To test this hypothesis, we need 
additional information on how the mean results would change if nothing (other than 
^The odds reported for the stringently-screened product were 1 in 100 million. 
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the participants) was changed (this would allow us to estimate the within-group 
variability) and if the odds of infection were arbitrarily changed (this would allow us 
to determine the extent to which the participants responded to the probabilities we 
provided) and if the specific pathogens name and description was changed to generic 
foodborne illness (this would verify the response to presence of risk rather than the 
risk level). To address these issues, an additional six experiments were conducted. 
These results are discussed in the next section. 
22 
THE GENERALITY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
To derive more meaningful policy implications from these experiments, one 
must assume that people responded in a rational way to the probabilities that were 
provided. The experiments just discussed accurately portrayed the probabilities and 
WTP for a single meal. Can we assume that these values double if two meals are 
involved? Equivalently, can we assume that the value doubles if the probability of 
infection is doubled? 
To answer these questions, we re-ran the Salmonella WTP experiment five 
times. The only difference among these Salmonella experiments was the probability 
provided after trial 10. In the first of these experiments, we reported the odds of 
becoming sick as one in 13.7. In each of the five subsequent experiments, we 
increased these odds by a factor of 10. These results are summarized in Figure 3 and 
Table 5. Notice the relatively wide range in WTP before trial 11. All six of these 
experiments were identical in every way before trial 11. Any differences that exist 
prior to trial 11 can therefore be attributed to differences among the six groups in 
terms of their composition and the group dynamics they exhibited. The range of the 
mean values at trials 7 through 10 was from 44c to $1.32. This range is greater than 
that obtained when alternative pathogens were used (see Table 3). 
In one experiment, shown by (•) in Figure 3, the second reported bid was lower 
than the first. This convinced most participants that they had overbid and became a 
self-fulfilling expectation. In the experiment denoted by (A) in Figure 3, the opposite 
occurred. 
As expected, WTP increased dramatically when participants discovered that 
there was a 1 in 13.7 chance that the sandwich was contaminated. Also expected was 
the dramatic decrease when the 1 in 1.37 million odds were used.^ However, WTP 
did not increase in proportion to the changes in the odds but rather in proportion to 
the common log of the odds. The regression results were 
WTP = 1.920 + 0.2910 * LOGio(Probability). = 0.72 
(0.365) (0.091) 
This regression is demonstrated in Figure 4, where we fit a semi-log regression 
through the WTP results. For each tenfold change in probability, WTP increased by 
29g. These results seem to indicate that participants do not increase their WTP to 
fully reflect the changes in the odds. For example, had we doubled the odds in the 
original Salmonella experiment, WTP would have increased from 550 to 
approximately 600 and not to $1.10 as one would expect. 
These additional Salmonella experiments shed some light on the original 
experiments. Participants bid a relatively high value to avoid the Clostridium 
perfringens-Xd^miQA sandwich, not because they were particularly concerned about the 
pathogen but because they failed to incorporate some of the information we provided 
on incidence rates. The additional results also show that any attempt to rank the 
pathogens by using the WTA or WTP trials would be meaningless. The intra-group 
variability (as measured by the range of the Salmonella results) is greater than the 
^In this case, the reported odds for the test product were greater than those for 
the stringently-screened product, a feature that was not fully reflected in the bids 
until trial 17. 
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variability of responses among pathogens. Any differences we detected among the 
pathogens in the first ten trials can therefore be attributed to the different participant 
groups we used. These results also indicate that participants overestimated the very 
small odds, underestimated the very large odds, and reacted to the presence of risk 
as much as to the actual level. 
One additional experiment with generic foodborne pathogen name supports that 
the ranking of the important foodborne pathogens to consumers' welfare would be 
meaningless, because consumers reacted to the presence of the foodborne illness risk 
rather than to the level of the foodborne risk level. Table 6 conclude that the 
subjects bid with the same pattern as the specific pathogens experiments. The 
average bid of trials 7 through 10 was 73c and 780 for the trials 17 through 20, in 
which was within the same range from 44c to $1,32. 
Participants were forced to choose between two meals: one which they knew 
was safe and one that had a small probability of being infected with an unsafe 
pathogen. The participants consistently chose to pay between 40c and $1 to purchase 
the safer product. Despite our efforts to glean pathogen-specific information from 
this experiment, about all that one can conclude is that participants were willing to 
pay approximately 70c to upgrade to the safe food. This figure is the simple average 
of the means of trials 17 through 20 from the five original WTP experiments. The 
WTP bid of 78c in generic foodborne experiment was higher than the average WTP 
of five WTP experiments because the actual odd was added up the odds of the five 
pathogens (see Appendix 2). 
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
To date, measures of the benefits to society of further improvements in the 
safety of the food supply or of the costs of existing levels of food-borne illness have 
ignored the pain and suffering involved in being ill. In so doing, the literature 
underestimates the true figures. In this paper we develop and implement an 
experimental procedure that causes the participants to evaluate and report their WTP 
to purchase a meal with a much lower probability of contamination than existing 
levels. 
The results show that this experimental method is a blunt instrument. The 
experiment forced participants to evaluate their WTA and WTP and to report these 
values in an honest manner. However, because the participant did not incorporate 
all the pathogen-specific information, one cannot interpret these results on a 
pathogen-by-pathogen basis. 
If we take the average WTP from trials 17 through 20 as a measure of the 
benefit per meal of safer food (70c) and multiply this by the number of meals per 
year that might possibly be contaminated^ we obtain an average WTP of $364 per 
participant per year. If we are prepared to make equally heroic assumptions, we can 
extend the Salmonella experiments to indicate that participants would pay 
^Not all meals are unsafe. Some meals are prepared at home in a fool-proof 
fashion; others are not complex enough to contain pathogens (e.g., coffee). In the 
pretrial survey, we asked participants how many meat-based meals they ate per week. 
The average response was 7.5; therefore, we assume that only 10 meals per week 
might possibly be contaminated. 
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approximately 290 per meal or $150 per year to reduce existing levels of food-borne 
pathogens by a factor of 10. If the participants in this study reflect the average U.S. 
consumer, the aggregate WTP for the United States is $91 billion for almost 
complete elimination and $38 billion for a tenfold reduction. 
These figures are considerably greater than previous estimates and yet are 
based on a conservative interpretation of our experimental results. We have not 
attempted to measure how much it would cost to reduce or eliminate these 
pathogens; however, it seems likely that a great deal could be done for less than $38 
billion to $91 billion. Perhaps this explains the current emphasis on food safety in 
the United States and other developed countries. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Probabilities of the five foodborne illnesses 
Disease Agent 
Percent of Foodborne Fatalities Probability 
Foodborne Cases 
Per Year % # 
Per Meal 
Campylobacter 100 2,100,000 0.1 2,100 1/125,143 
Salmonella 96 1,920,000 0.1 1,920 1/137,000 
Staphylococcus 
aureus 
17 1,513,000 0.08 1,210 1/173,694 
Trichinella 
spiralis 
100 100,000 1.0 1,000 1/2,628,000 
Clostridium 
peifiingens 
100 10,000 1.0 100 1/26,280,000 
Note: Data calculated from the Bennett et al. (1987). 
Note: Approximate population is 250 million. 
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Table 2. Comparison of WTP and WTA of five pathogens 
Pathogen 
/Probability^ 
Inexperienced 
One Shot 
(1" Trial) 
Naive 
(Tth.ioth Trials) 
Informed 
(17th.2o>h Trials) 
I of Illness / 
Mean Mean Mean 
Campylobacter 
(1/125,143) 
WTP = 0.60 
(0.50) 
WTA = 5.06 
(4.55) 
WTP = 0.71 
(0.43) 
WTA = 2.36 
(3.89) 
WTP = 0.86 
(0.38) 
WTA = 3.03 
(4.39) 
Salmonella 
(1/137,000) 
WTP = 0.61 
(0.53) 
WTA = 8029 
(25957) 
WTP = 0.44 
(0.23) 
WTA = 8.01 
(25.46) 
WTP = 0.55 
(0.25) 
WTA = 1.62 
(2.00) 
Stapylococcus 
aureus 
(1/173,694) 
WTP = 0.97 
(0.39) 
WTA = 5.55 
(7.86) 
WTP = 0.92 
(0.32) 
WTA = 3.89 
(8.19) 
WTP = 0.84 
(0.33) 
WTA = 56.2 
(205.87) 
Trichinella 
spiralis 
(1/2,628,000) 
WTP = 0.48 
(0.42) 
WTA = 12.8 
(24.80) 
WTP = 0.69 
(0.46) 
WTA = 10.51 
(25.36) 
WTP = 0.81 
(0.55) 
WTA = 18.0 
(50.82) 
Clostridium 
peifiingens 
(1/26,280,000) 
WTP = 0.64 
(0.63) 
WTA = 30.2 
(50.56) 
WTP = 0.58 
(0.41) 
WTA = 1.98 
(1.37) 
WTP = 0.42 
(0.33) 
WTA = 2.21 
(1.70) 
Note: Sample sizes are as follows: Camplyobacter (WTP = 15, WTA = 14), Salmonella (WTP = 15, 
WTA = 15), Stapylococcus aureus (WTP = 12, WTA = 15), Trichinella spiralis (WTP = 13, WTA = 15), 
Clostridium perfringens (WTP = 13, WTA = 15). 
Note: Sample standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Table 3. Comparison of WTP of five pathogens experiments 
Probability of Illness 
Hp : WTP,7.J(]^ — WTP7.,orf, 
H, ; WTP,7.20rt * WTP7.,J^ 
Experiment 
Actual Subjective Mean' Mean'' t-tesf* Sign rank test' 
Campylobacter 1/125,143 1/994,550 
WTP17.20 = 0.86 
(038)" 
WTP^o = 0.71 
(0.43) 
WTPoiit = 0.15 
(030)" 2.33" 24' 
Salmonella 1/137,000 1/212,000 
0
 
0
 
'
i'
il 
W If Din = 0.11 
(0.10) 4.13" 39" 
Staphylococcus 
aureus 1/173,694 1/2,927,807 
WTP,7.2, = 0.84 
(033) 
WTP7.,O =0.92 
(0.32) 
WTPujff = -0.08 
(0.12) -2.14* -21" 
Trichinella 
spiralis 1/2,628,000 1/6,186,440 
WTP,72. = 0.81 
(065) 
WTP7.,O - 0.69 
(0.46) 
WTPoiff = 0.12 
(0.25) 1.59 19 
Clostridium 
perpingens 1/26,280,000 1/313,843 
WTP,7.20 = 0.42 
(033) 
WTP7.,O = 0.58 
(0.41) 
WTPoia = 0.16 
(0.27) -2.25" -26"" 
Note: Sample size are as follows: Camplyobacter (WTP = 15), Salmonella (WTP = 15), Stapylococcus aureus 
(WTP = 12), Trichinella spiralis (WTP = 13), Clostridimn perfringens (WTP = 13). 
* Mean of trials 17 through 20 and mean of trials 7 through 10. 
" Sample standard deviation are in parentheses. 
' Difference between the mean of trials 17 through 20 and mean of trials 7 through 10. 
" *, ** denotes rejection of Ho at the 0.05, 0.01 significance level for two-tail t test. 
' *, ** denotes rejection of Hq at the 0.05, 0.01 significance level for Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Table 4. Comparison between trials within WTP experiment 
WTP between ll*" and 10'" WTP between 20® and 10"" 
Pathogens H,,: WTAu = WTA,o Hg: WTAjo = \VTA,o 
H,: WTA„ * WTAio H,: WTA^, * WTA.p 
probability^ 
\ of illness 1 Mean of t-test Sign-rank Mean of t-test Sign-rank 
difference test difference test 
Càmpylobacler 038 3.47" 39" 0.17 3.15" 28" 
(1/125,143) (0.42) (0.21) 
Salmonella 0.17 2.64" 27" 0.11 3.09" 21.5" 
(1/137,000) (0.25) (0.14) 
Staphylococcus 0.05 0.88 11.5 -0.14 -4.75" -31" 
(1/173,694) (0.18) (0.10) 
Trichinella 0.06 0.79 18.5 0.07 0.99 8.5 
(1/2,628,000) (0.28) (0.25) 
Clostridium 0.14 0.71 65 -0.20 -237' -20.5* 
(1/26,280,000) (0.68) (031) 
Note: '• " denotes rejection of at the 0.05 and 0.01 significance level for t-test and sign-rank test. 
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Table 5. Summary statistics of tests within each Salmonella experiment 
H, :  
' - WTP7.,Q^ 
: WTPI7.2O^ * WTP7.10^ 
Experiment 
/Probability^ 
Difference ( Mean of trials lT''-20"' - ^-lO'" ) 
\ of iiness / 
Mean" Mean® t-tesf* Sign rank test' 
1/13.7 
W i P 17.20 = 1.42 
(0.57)" 
WTP7.,O = 0.54 
(0.30) 
WTPqju = 0.88 
(0.36)" 9.04" 52.5" 
1/137 
WTP,7.2O = 1.76 
(0.80) 
WTPT.IO = 0.88 
(0.45) 
WTPoiif — 0.88 
(0.57) 5.84" 45.5" 
1/1,370 
WTP,7.2O = 0.50 
(0.21) 
WTP7.,O = 0.52 
(0.20) 
WTPoijf —"0.02 
(0.09) -0.84 -11.5 
1/13,700 
WTPi7.2O = 0.92 
(0.30) 
WTP7.10 = 0.67 
(0.23) 
WTPDIB = 0.25 
(0.12) 8.15" 52.5" 
1/137,000 
WTP,7.JO = 0.55 
(0.25) 
WTP7.,O = 0.44 
(0.23) 
WTPoia = 0.11 
(0.10) 4.13" 39.0" 
1/1,370,000 
WTP,7.2O = 0.02 
(0.06) 
WTPT.IO = 1.32 
(0.95) 
WTPoiu =-1.30 
(0.93) -5.42" -45.5" 
Note: The sample size are as follows: 1/13.7 (n = 14), 1/137 (n = 14), 1/1,370 (n = 15), 
1/13,700 (n = 15), 1/137,000 (n = 15), 1/1,370,000 (n = 15). 
'Mean of trials 17 throu^ 20 and mean of trials 7 through 10. 
"Sample standard deviation are in parentheses. 
Difference between the mean of trials 17 through 20 and mean of trials 7 through 10. 
""The t statistics are shown and ** denotes rejection of H, at the 0.01 significance level for two-
tail t-test. 
The critical values are shown and ** denotes rejection of Hg at the 0.01 significance level for 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Table 6. Summary of generic foodbome illness experiment 
Probability 
Actual Subjective. 
1/46,585 1/733,423 
Inexperienced 
(1« trial) 
Naive 
7 -10" 10" 11" 
Informed 
17 - 20'" 20" 
Mean 
WTP 
132 
(2.00) 
0.73 
(0.46) 
0.63 
(0.44) 
1.03 
(0.98) 
0.78 
(0.41) 
0.81 
(0.45) 
WTP between 11"" and 10"" 
Ho : WTP„ = WTP,o 
Hi : WTP„ # WTPio 
Mean of 
difference 
0.40 
(0.79) 
t-test 
1.96 
Sign-rank 
test 
32.5" 
WTP between 20,^ and lO,;, 
Ho : WTPjo = WTP,o 
Hi : WTP^ * WTPio 
Mean of 
difference 
0.18 
(0.26) 
t-test 
2.67 
Sign-rank 
test 
38'" 
denotes rejection of H, at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 significance level for t-test and sign-rank test. 
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Figure 1. Comparison of average WTA: Five foodbome pathogens 
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Figure 2. Comparison of average WTP: Five foodbome pathogens 
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Figure 3. Average WTP of Salmonella'. With different probability of illness 
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APPENDIX 1 
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
# 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
You are about to participate in an experiment about decision making. Please follow the instructions 
carefully. The United States Department of Agriculture has provided funds for this research. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS 
In this experiment, you will be asked to decide how much you would be willing to pay for safer food 
[to decide the minimum amount you would be willing to accept for taking the test product food, instead of 
keeping your safer food]. The experiment has two stages. 
Your starting income will be $3 in stage 1. Your income will be $15 for stage 2. Your take-home 
income will consist of your initial income ($3 + $15) minus [plus] the value of goods purchased [the 
rewarded value of willingness to accept]. 
You will submit your bidding price on a recording card. Note only one of the trials in stage 1 will 
be binding and only one of the twenty trials in stage 2 will be binding. A number will be randomly selected 
to identify these binding trials. 
You cannot reveal your bids to any other participant. Any communication between bidders during 
a trial will result in an automatic penalty of $3. 
ABOUT YOU 
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1. Your sex : Male Female 
2. Your age : 19 or under 
20-24  
25-29  
30-34  
35 - 39 
40-44  
45-49  
50 or over 
3. How many individuals live in your household, including yourself? 
If you have children, how old are they? 
4. Do you eat red meat? Yes No 
Do you eat poultry? Yes No 
Do you eat fish? Yes No 
5. How often do you eat red meat, poultry, fish? 
Number of times you eat red meat per week? 
Number of times you eat poultry per week? 
Number of times you eat fish per week? 
6. Do you eat chicken sandwiches? Yes No 
7. Have you ever had food poisoning? 
Yes No Don't know 
8. If you became sick with a food-borne disease, how much money would you lose per day in addition to 
medical costs (i.e., lost wages)? 
dollars per day 
If you have sick leave benefits still indicate what your wage rate on this line. 
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CONSENT FORM 
# 
You are about to participate in an experiment in willingness-to-pay [willingness-to-accept] for food 
safety [risk]. The purpose is to gain insight into what you are willing to pay for the guarantee that a food 
product will be safe [willing to accept for bearing the risk of foodborne illness in test product]. 
We need your signed consent if you are to act as a subject. Your participation in the experiment is 
completely voluntary and you may withdraw from the experiment at any time without prejudice to you. 
Results from the experiment will be strictly confidential. Any name associated with the experiment will be 
deleted upon completion of the experiment. 
If you consent to participate in the experiment, please sign the consent form below. 
I have read the consent form statement and agree to act as subject in the experiment, with the 
understanding that I can withdraw from the experiment at any time without prejudice to me. 
Signature 
I L 
Date 
. 
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STAGE 1 # 
Step 1 : You own the candy [candy bar] free in front of you. Your initial income is $3. 
Step 2 : Let's say you are willing to [would] pay $X for the piece of candy [candy bar] and $Y for a candy 
bar [a piece of candy]. The difference ($Y - $X) [($X - $Y)] is what you are willing to pay [the 
minimum amount that you are willing to accept] to upgrade [trade] your piece of candy [candy bar] 
into [for] a candy bar [piece of candy]. 
Please indicate your willingness to pay [your minimum willingness to accept] to trade the piece of 
candy [candy bar] for a candy bar [a piece of candy]. Do not state what you would pay [accept] 
for an entire candy bar [piece of candy]. Only state the difference ($Y - $X) [($X - $Y)]you are 
willing to pay [accept]. 
Step 3 : Please write your bid (difference) for the one candy bar [piece of candy] on the recording card. 
The monitor will announce the highest [lowest] bidder and display the price of the candy bar 
fsecond-highest [second-lowest] bidding priced on the blackboard. 
Note : For example, if the highest [lowest] bid was $a and the second-highest [second-lowest] bid was $J3, 
the highest [lowest] bidder would receive [take] the candy bar [the piece of candy] and must pay 
[will receive] $13. 
Step 4 : There will be five trials. 
Step S : Only one trial will be binding. After the Gve trials, a number will be randomly selected to 
determine which trial is binding. The highest [lowest] bidder of that trial will exchange the piece 
of candy [the candy bar] for the candy bar [the piece of candy] and must pay [will receive] the 
displayed price (i.e., the second-highest [second-lowest] bid'). 
Note : In the event that there is a tie for the highest [lowest] bid, those participants will be asked to bid 
again. 
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Questions 
Please answer the following questions, which are designed to help you understand stage 1. Do not 
hesitate to ask the researchers if you have questions. 
1. Suppose that person A is the highest [lowest] bidder in the first trial, person B is the highest [lowest] 
bidder in third trial, and person C is the highest [lowest] bidder in fifth trial. If, after five trials are 
finished, we randomly select the third trial, then who will trade the piece of candy [candy bar] for the 
candy bar [the piece of candy] ? 
2. If your $a bid is the highest [lowest] in the third trial, and the second-highest [second-lowest] bid is 
$B, what price will you pay [receive] for the candy bar [the piece of candy] ? 
$ 
3. If your bid is not the highest [lowest] m the third trial, which is randomly selected, how much should 
[will] you pay [receive] for the piece of candy [candy bar] ? 
44 
STAGE 2 #. 
Step 1 : There are two types of food. The features of each are described below. 
Test Product Stringently Screened 
This food has a typical chance of being 
contaminated with the food-borne 
pathogen Salmonella; i.e., it is purchased 
from a local source. 
This food has been subjected to stringent 
screening for Salmonella. There is a 1 in 
100.000.000 chance of getting 
salmonellosis from consuming this food. 
Step 2 : You own a test product sandwich [a stringently screened] free in front of you. Everyone has the 
same test [stringently screened] sandwich. You also have initial income, $15. 
Step 3 : Let's say you willing to pay $X for the test product sandwich and $Y for the stringently screened 
sandwich. The difference ($Y - $X) is what you are willing to pay to reduce the risk of illness 
from the food-borne pathogens. [Let's say $Y is the minimum amount that you are willing to 
accept to bear the risk of illness from the food-borne pathogens that might be contained in the 
test product sandwich, instead of keeping your stringently screened sandwich]. 
Please indicate your willingness to pay [indicate the amount of your minimum willingness to 
accept] to reduce [to bear] the risk of illness. Do not state what you would pay for the entire 
stringently screened sandwich. Only state the difference ($Y - $X) you are willing to pay. 
The highest [lowest] bidder will upgrade [trade] his or her test product [stringently screened] 
sandwich for the stringently screened [test product] sandwich. He or she will pay [receive] tk 
second-highest [second-lowest] bidder's price. 
Step 4 : There will be twenty trials. 
Step S : After all twenty trials are complete, we will randomly select one binding trial to determine who 
buys [will have] the stringently screened [the test product] food. 
Note : The sandwich has to be eaten to leave with the take-home income. 
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Questions 
Please answer the following questions, which are designed to help you understand stage 2. Do not 
hesitate to ask the researchers if you have questions. 
1. There are twenty bidding trials. If person A is the highest [lowest] bidder in the first trial, person B 
is the highest [lowest] bidder in the eighteenth trial, and the eighteenth trial is selected, then who will 
receive the stringently screened [test product] food? 
2. If your $a bid is the highest [lowest] in the eighteenth trial, and the second highest [second lowest] bid 
is $fi, what price will you pay [receive] for the stringently screened [test product] food? $ 
NOTE : Please answer the questions below. 
1. What do you think is the chance of becoming ill from Salmonella, given that you eat an average 
amount of typical food products in the United States over one vear? 
Answer: chance out of 1 million people 
2. What do you think are the important sources of the food-borne pathogen. Salmonella, in the 
United States? 
Please list the type of food items. 
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AGREEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING FORM 
#. 
The risks you took in eating this food are identical to those you take when eating meals you prepare 
at home or purchase when eating out. 
Please sign below to indicate that you have read and understood the above announcement. 
Signature 
I L 
Date 
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APPENDIX 2 
Information for Trials 11-20 # .  
Test Product 
If you eat this food, there is a 1 in 125.143 
chance that you will become ill from 
Campylobacter. 
Stringently Screened 
This food has been subjected to stringent 
screening for Campylobacter. There is a 
1 in 100.000.000 chance of getting 
Campylobacteriosis from consummg this 
food. 
Description of Campylobacteriosis : 
Symptoms are those of a intestinal disease with acute diarrhea and severe abdominal pains. 
Diarrhea is preceded by brief fever and malaise. The actual individual chance of infection of 
Campylobacteriosis is 1 in 114 annually. Of those individuals who get sick, 1 mdividual out of 1,000 
will die annually. The average cost for medical expenses and productivity losses from a mild case 
of Campylobacterisosis is $230. 
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Information for Trials 11-20 # .  
Test Product Stringently Screened 
If you eat this food, there is a 1 in 137.000 
chance that you will become ill from 
Salmonella. 
This food has been subjected to stringent 
screening for Salmonella. There is a 1 in 
100.000.000 chance of getting 
Salmonellosis from consuming this food. 
Description of Salmonellosis : 
Symptoms are those of a mild "flu-like" intestinal disease of short duration with abdominal pains, 
nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. The actual individual chance of infection of Salmonellosis is 1 in 
125 annually. Of those individuals who get sick, 1 individual out of 1,000 will die annually. The 
average cost for medical expenses and productivity losses from a mild case of Salmonellosis is $220. 
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Information for Trials 11-20 #, 
Test Product 
If you eat this food, there is a 1 in 173.694 
chance that you will become ill from 
Staphylococcus aureus. 
Stringently Screened 
This food has been subjected to stringent 
screening for Stapylococcus aureus. 
There is a 1 in 100.000.000 chance of 
getting Staphylococcal food poisoning 
from consuming this food. 
Description of Staphylococcal food poisoning : 
Symptoms are nausea, vomiting, abdominal pains, and diarrhea. The actual individual chance of 
infection of Staphylococcal food poisoning is 1 in 159 annually. Of those individuals who get sick, 
1 individual out of 1,250 will die annually. The average cost for medical expenses and productivity 
losses from a case of Staphylococcus aureus is $600. 
50 
Information for Trials 11-20 # .  
Test Product 
If you eat tliis food, there is a 1 in 
2.628.000 chance that you will become ill 
from Trichinella. 
Stringently Screened 
This food has been subjected to stringent 
screening for Trichinella. There is a 1 in 
100.000.000 chance of getting 
Trichinellosis from consuming this food. 
Description of Trichinellosis : 
Symptoms are mtestinal disease with nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, and diarrhea in intestinal 
maturation phase. During muscular migration, it begins with edema of the upper eyelids, 
headaches, fever and sweating and chills. The actual individual chance of infection of salmonellosis 
is 1 in 2,400 annually. Of those individuals who get sick, 1 individual out of 100 will die annually. 
The average cost for medical expenses and productivity losses from a case of Trichinellosis $2,485. 
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Information for Trials 11-20 
Test Product 
If you eat tliis food, there is a 1 in 
26.280.000 chance that you will become ill 
from Clostirdium perfringens. 
# ,  
Stringently Screened 
This food has been subjected to stringent 
screening for Clostridium perfringens. 
There is a 1 in 100.000.000 chance of 
getting Clostridial food poisoning from 
consuming this food. 
Description of Clostridial food poisoning : 
Symptoms are acute intestinal disease of short duration with abdominal pains and diarrhea. The 
actual individual chance of infection of Clostridial food poisoning is 1 in 24,000 annually. Of those 
individuals who get sick, 1 individual out of 100 will die annually. The average cost for medical 
expenses and productivity losses from a case of Clostridial food poisoning is $5,100. 
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Information for Trials 11-20 
Test Product 
If you eat this food, there is a 1 in 46.585 
chance that you will become ill from food-
borne illnesses. 
#, 
Stringently Screened 
This food has been subjected to stringent 
screening for food-borne pathogens. 
There is a 1 in 100.000.000 chance of 
getting food-borne illnesses from 
consuming this food. 
Description of Food-borne Illnesses : 
Symptoms are those of a intestinal disease with abdominal pains, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. 
The actual individual chance of infection of food-bome illness is 1 in 43 annually. Of those 
individuals who get sick, 1 individual out of 44 will die annually. The average cost for medical 
expenses and productivity losses from a case of food-bome illness is $374. 
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SECTION II. 
EXPERIMENTAL SUPPORT FOR HANEMANN'S CONJECTURE ON THE 
DIVERGENCE BETWEEN WTP AND WTA MEASURES OF VALUE 
54 
ABSTRACT 
We provide experimental support for Hanemann's conjecture that the 
divergence of willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) is driven by 
the elasticity of substitution between goods. For a market good with close substitutes 
(candy bar), our results indicate a convergence of WTP and WTA measures of value. 
In contrast, for a nonmarket good with imperfect substitutes (health), the divergence 
of WTP and WTA value measures is persistent, even with repeated market exposure 
and full information on the nature of the good. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, a consistent and frustrating pattern of empirical 
evidence has accumulated suggesting a significant divergence between willingness to 
pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) measures of value. Field-contingent 
valuation studies first uncovered the pattern and laboratory markets have confirmed 
that the divergence is persistent [see, for example, Judd Hammack and Gardner M. 
Brown, Jr. (1974), Robert D. Rowe et al. (1980), Jack L. Knetsch and John A. Sinden 
(1984), and David S. Brookshire and Don L. Coursey (1987)]. The divergence is 
troubling in that standard theory predicts that with small income effects WTP and 
WTA should be equivalent [see Robert Willig (1976)]. The evidence that they are 
not suggests a need to reexamine the analytical foundations of value measures. 
In response, Michael W. Hanemann (1991) has offered a straightforward 
explanation of why divergence occurs and by how much. By expanding traditional 
theory to include both substitution and income effects, Hanemann demonstrated that 
the divergence can range from zero to infinity, depending on whether the elasticity of 
substitution between goods is infinite or zero, given positive income elasticity. 
Hanemann proposed that we should expect convergence of WTP and WTA value 
measures when the good in question has a perfect substitute. When the good has an 
imperfect substitute, a value divergence will exist and will expand as the elasticity of 
substitution decreases. 
This paper tests Hanemann's proposition in an nonhypothetical experimental 
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auction market. Our results strongly support his argument. We find that, for a 
private-market food product with a relatively close substitute, the divergence of WTP 
and WTA value measures disappears with repeated exposure to the market. In 
contrast, for a private nonmarket good with no close substitute, the divergence is 
robust and persistent, even given repeated market exposure and full information on 
the dimensions of the good. These results suggest that the elasticity of substitution 
may prove to be a key to unlocking the troubling divergence of value measures. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes our general experimental 
design in terms of Hanemann's proposition. Sections 2 and 3 outline the 
experimental procedures and results, respectively. Our conclusions are offered in 
Section 4. 
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HANEMANN'S PROPOSITION AND GENERAL EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Figure 1 illustrates the simple analytics of Hanemann's argument [also see 
Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer (1990)]. Part (a) of Figure 1 presents the 
case in which goods X and Y are perfect substitutes, i.e., the elasticity of substitution 
is infinite. Let the individual start at point A with endowments of Xq and Yq. If the 
individual's endowment of Xg is increased to Xj, then the maximum he or she would 
be willing to pay for this change is the distance AB, or the compensating surplus. 
The minimum he or she would be willing to accept not to change is AC, or the 
equivalent surplus. Given perfect substitutability between X and Y, AB equals AC. 
Therefore, given a positive income elasticity, we should expect to see convergence of 
WTP and WTA measures of value. 
Part (b) of Figure 1 presents the case in which X and Y are imperfect 
substitutes. The individual is again willing to pay A'B' to secure the change. Note 
that A'B' equals AB. Now, however, the individual must receive A'C not to 
change. Hanemann rigorously demonstrated that A'C exceeds A'B' and that this 
divergence expands as the elasticity of substitution between X and Y decreases. 
To test Hanemaim's proposition, we used the following general experimental 
design in which both a nonhypothetical market good and a nonhypothetical 
noiunarket good were auctioned off using either the WTP or WTA measures of 
value. Similar to Daniel Kahneman et al. (1990), we auctioned off a brand-name 
candy bar to compare WTP and WTA value measures for a market good with 
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relatively close substitutes. Our hypothesis was that the subjects would have a 
relatively high elasticity of substitution for the candy bar and all other composite 
commodities as represented by wealth. If Hanemann is correct, then the WTP and 
WTA measures of value will converge. If the value measures do not converge, then 
there is further support for Kahneman et al.'s argument of a fundamental 
"endowment" effect in the theory of choice [also see Jack Knetsch (1989)]. The 
endowment effect can be interpreted as existing when the individual becomes 
attached to the good, thereby causing the subject to demand a higher level of 
compensation than he or she was originally willing to pay. 
To compare the case of imperfect substitutes, we auctioned off a nonmarket 
good as represented by reduced health risk from food-borne pathogens. Our 
hypothesis was that the subjects would have a relatively low elasticity of substitution 
between health and all other composite commodities as represented by wealth. 
Again, if Hanemann is correct, then our ex ante expectation is that the WTA 
measures should be significantly greater than the WTP measures. Given our 
experimental design, we now restate Hanemann's proposition as follows. 
Convergence Proposition: Given positive income elasticity, the WTP and WTA 
measures of value will converge for the market good with close substitutes 
(candy bar), but will not converge for the nonmarket good with imperfect 
substitutes (health risk from food-borne pathogens). 
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If we can reject the convergence proposition, then we cannot support 
Hanemann's argument. In this case, other explanations such as the endowment effect 
or loss aversion become more attractive. If we cannot reject the proposition, 
however, then we can offer support to the conjecture that the elasticity of substitution 
is a key to understanding the convergence or divergence between WTP and WTA 
measures of value. 
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EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
The experiment was divided into two stages. Stage 1 was the market good 
auction. Stage 2 was the nomnarket good auction. Subjects participated in both 
stages either for the WTP or WTA experiment. We will discuss each stage in more 
detail for the WTP experiment. See the Appendix for the instructions for the WTP 
experiment. The WTA experiment was identical to the WTP experiment in all 
aspects except for the value measure and initial ownership of the good. 
In Stage 1, each subject was provided an initial income of $3 and a small piece 
of candy. To facilitate learning and value formation, the auction was repeated over 
five trials. The number of trials was selected after extensive pretesting to determine 
how quickly individual value measures stabilized. Note that to control wealth effects, 
we made the subjects fully aware that only one of the five trials was binding. The 
binding trial was selected at random by a Monte Carlo number generator on a 
personal computer. In an attempt to accurately elicit preferences, we used a Vickrey 
second-price sealed-bid auction [see William Vickrey (1961)]. The Vickrey auction 
has been successfully used to elicit values in various experimental settings [see Don 
L. Coursey (1987) and Jason F. Shogren (1990)]. 
The market good was a regular-size brand-name candy bar. Each subject was 
asked the maximum he or she would be willing to pay to upgrade the small piece of 
candy to the brand-name candy bar. For each trial, each subject recorded a bid on a 
recording card that was collected by the monitor. The highest bidder's identification 
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number and the reigning price (the second-highest bid) were posted as public 
information on a blackboard. 
Stage 2 was the nonmarket good auction. The procedures were similar to 
those in Stage 1 with some noted exceptions. An initial income of $15 was provided 
to each participant. Two types of food items were then shown to the subjects with a 
description of each item. The first type was the test product. The test product 
represented food purchased from a local source with a typical chance of being 
contaminated with a food-borne pathogen from one-time consumption. Five food-
borne pathogens were considered in five separate experimental sessions: 
Campylobacter, Salmonella, Staphylococcus aureus, Trichinella spiralis and Clostridium 
perfringens.^ All five pathogens occur in the United States. The test product was 
provided to every participant as a free lunch. The second food type was stringently 
screened food. The stringently screened food had been tested for food-borne 
pathogens and had a low probability (1 in 100 million) of causing food-borne illness. 
Each participant was then asked the maximum he or she would be willing to 
pay to upgrade the test product to the screened food product. The bidding procedure 
was the same as that used in Stage 1 except that there were twenty trials in Stage 2. 
"Naive" bids were elicited in the first ten trials. The bids were naive in that the 
subjects were not given any information on the actual probabilities of contracting a 
food-borne illness from consuming the typical food product. After the tenth trial, the 
^We report results for all five pathogens because measures of consumers' WTA and 
WTP to reduce or eliminate these pathogens are interesting in their own right. See 
Tanya Roberts and David Smallwood (1991). 
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monitor supplied three items of information: (a) the actual probability of becoming ill 
from eating a year's supply of the typical food product; (b) a description of the 
severity of the illness; and (c) the symptoms and average medical cost of a mild case 
of infection. For Salmonella, the following information was provided [see John V. 
Bennett et al. (1987) and Tanya Roberts (1989)]. 
Description of Salmonellosis : 
Symptoms are those of a mild flu-like intestinal disease of short 
duration with abdominal pains, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. The 
actual individual chance of infection of salmonellosis is 1 in 125 
annually. Of those individuals who get sick, 1 individual out of 1,000 
will die annually. The average cost for medical expenses and 
productivity losses from a mild case of salmonellosis is $220. 
Given this information, "informed" bids were elicited in trials 11 through 20. 
The computer randomly selected one of the twenty trials as binding. The 
highest bidder paid the displayed second-highest bidding price and ate the stringently 
screened food. The highest bidder's take-home income was $15 minus the price paid 
for the screened food product. The other bidders ate the test product and took home 
$15. Note that the subjects had to eat the food item to leave the experiment with the 
take-home income. 
Table 1 summarizes the experimental design for both the WTP and the WTA 
experiments. One hundred and forty-two subjects participated in the experiment. All 
were undergraduate and graduate students from Iowa State University (ISU), 
recruited campuswide. Note that a subject participated in either the WTA or the 
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WTP experiment, not both. Also, each subject was only confronted with one food-
borne pathogen, not all five, regardless whether he or she was in the WTA or the 
WTP experiment. After each subject read the instructions and answered a set of 
questions to test his or her understanding of the experiment and the monitor 
answered all relevant questions, the experiment began. All experiments were 
conducted in the ISU meat testing laboratory with modern kitchen facilities. The 
ISU meat lab conducts food tasting experiments on a regular basis. The lab is 
actively involved in all aspects of meat processing and handling, thereby providing a 
unique setting for our experiment. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Overall, we cannot reject the convergence proposition. Table 2 and Figure 2 
illustrate that the WTP and WTA measures of value for the market good were not 
significantly different, with the exception of the first trial. Repeated exposure to the 
auction market caused the values to converge [also see Don L. Coursey et al. (1987)]. 
Trial 1 represents the inexperienced one-shot bid analogous to the contingent 
valuation method. The average WTP-WTA difference in the one-shot bid equaled 11 
cents, and the null hypothesis that WTP and WTA were equal is rejected at the 5 
percent significance level. The value disparity converged, however, to a difference of 
6 cents in trial 2, which is not statistically significant. By trials 3, 4, and 5, the 
average WTP and WTA values converged to differences between 1 cent and 3 cents. 
We caimot reject the equality of the WTP and WTA measures. 
Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 3 through 7 illustrate that the majority of the 
WTA measures for the nonmarket good significantly exceed the WTP measures. This 
holds for both the naive bids (trials 7 through 10) and the informed bids (trials 17 
through 20). Note that the WTP and WTA measures for each pathogen are 
examined with the two mean values: without elimination of the highest and lowest 
bids and with elimination. We consider elimination to explore Robin Gregory and 
Uta Furby's (1987) argument that values are extremely sensitive to one or two 
outliers [also see Robert C. Mitchell and Richard T. Carson (1989)]. They 
reexamined Coursey et al.'s sucrose octa-acetate (SOA) experiment with elimination 
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of outliers and found that the results of value convergence depend on inclusion of the 
outlier. To illustrate the robustness of our results, we consider values with and 
without the elimination of outliers. 
Means of the WTP experiment without elimination closely coincided with 
those with elimination. In the WTA experiment, outliers change the majority of the 
mean values, especially for Salmonella, Staphylococcus aureus, and Trichinella spiralis. 
For the initial one-shot bid in trial 1, we observed extremely high WTA values. For 
Salmonella, the mean WTA is more than thirteen thousand times greater than the 
mean WTP without elimination and is still three thousand times greater with 
elimination. WTA for Clostridium peifringens is forty-seven times greater than WTP 
without elimination. WTA divergence for the other pathogens ranges from four to 
thirty four times greater than that for WTP. For the initial one-shot bid, we 
performed a one-tail t-test and the Mann-Whitney rank-sum [/-test to test the 
significance of the divergence between WTP and WTA According to the rank-sum 
test, the null hypothesis of all pathogens that WTP and WTA values are from the 
same parental population is rejected at the 5 precent significance level. 
For most of the naive bids (trials 7 through 10), the average bidding prices 
stay relatively constant in both the WTP and the WTA bids. This result is consistent 
with Coursey's observation that Vickrey auctions usually stabilize by the sixth or 
seventh trial. The mean WTA for trials 7 through 10 ranges from approximately 
three times greater than that of the mean WTP for Campylobacter to approximately 
eighteen times greater than that of the mean WTP for Salmonella without 
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elimination. With elimination, the results indicate that the mean WTA is two to six 
times greater than the mean WTP. The disparities between WTP and WTA for each 
pathogen are tested by performing a multivariate analysis^ and a [/-test. Although 
the WTP and WTA experiments are statistically independent, we used multivariate 
analysis to account for the between-trial correlation among bids from the same 
subjects. The difference between WTP and WTA in the naive trials indicates that 
most pathogens are significantly different between WTP and WTA by t-test, both 
with and without elimination. The Salmonella experiment is statistically insignificant 
by t-test without elimination, but significant with elimination. 
^Let Xjjij be the subject's k"* bid in the j"* trial of i"* group. 
i = 1, 2 ( i = 1, WTP experiment; i = 2, WTA experiment) 
j = 7, 8, 9, 10 (trial) 
k = 1, 2,..., n, (number of subjects in experiment) 
Because Xjjjj and Xjj.^ (j * j') are not independent (measured repeatedly), 
multivariate analysis or split plot design can be applied. 
Suppose vector Xj = (X;?, Xj_g, X;_g, Xj ^ o)' (i = 1, 2) ~ MVN (/Xi, Zj) 
where Mi = (Mi, Mi.io)' 
Zi = r Var(Xj 7) Cov(Xj 7, Xjg) Cov(Xj 7, Xjg) Cov(Xj 7, Xj jq) 
Var(Xi 8) Cov(Xj g, Xj g) Cov(X; g, Xj ^ o) 
Var(Xj 9) Cov(Xj g, Xj jg) 
Symmetry Var(Xjio) 
Consider Yj = a'Xj where a' = &4(1, 1,1, 1)' (i = 1, 2). Then Yj = + Xjg 
+ Xi 9 + Xj 10) and Y2= Vi{X2p + Xgg + Xgg + Xj ^ q) are normally distributed with 
mean a'Mi, a'Mz and variance a'S^a, respectively. Because Y^ and Yg are 
independent, (Yj - Y;) is normally distributed with mean (a'Mi - a'Mz) and variance 
(a'S^a + a'Zja). There are n^, 1X2 samples from the WTP and the WTA 
experiments, respectively (i.e., using y^ ^ yi,», and y^ i,..., y2,n). 
To test the null hypothesis that there is a difference between the WTP and WTA 
experiments, we can use the t-test for the difference of the mean between the WTP 
and WTA experiments, [see Richard A. Johnson and Dean W. Wichem (1988)]. 
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For the informed bids (trials 17 through 20), we observed that bids initially 
increased from the information shock. The WTP experiments have a smaller 
increase relative to the WTA experiments. Again, after six trials with information, 
the mean WTP bid stabilizes. Mean WTA bids converge to lower values, with some 
variation in the last two or three trials. For trials 17 through 20, the differences 
between WTP and WTA range from three to five times in Salmonella, Campylobacter, 
and Clostridium perfringens. The WTP and WTA bids for these three pathogens are 
statistically significant with and without elimination. Staphylococcus aureus and 
Trichinella spiralis bids also are significantly different, both with and without 
elimination. 
In sum, we cannot reject the convergence proposition. For the market good 
with close substitutes, WTP and WTA measures of value are not statistically different 
with repeated market exposure. In contrast, for the nonmarket good with imperfect 
substitutes, WTP and WTA measures are significantly different, even after repeated 
market exposure and with full information about the probability and severity of the 
health risk. Our results support Hanemann's proposition that the elasticity of 
substitution drives the divergence between value measures. The opportunity to 
substitute goods may be the underlying motivation behind Kahneman et al.'s 
observa t ions  o f  an  endowment  e f fec t .  They  recognize  th i s  poss ib i l i ty ,  s t a t ing  tha t  " . . .  
endowment effects will almost certainly occur when owners are faced with an 
opportunity to sell an item purchased for use that is not easily replaceable" (p. 1344). 
If the endowment effect was not driven by substitutability, then we should have 
observed a divergence in value measures for the candy bar, which we did not. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The divergence in WTP and WTA measures of value has troubled economists 
for the past decade. The divergence even lead Ronald G. Cummings et al. (1986) to 
recommend in their Reference Operating Conditions (pp. 102-109) for contingent 
valuation that only WTP measures be elicited in the attempt to value nonmarket 
goods. Hanemann has offered an explanation grounded in economic theory, however, 
that may calm the fears that the divergence is some form of cognitive mistake. Our 
experimental results support his conjecture. For a market good with close substitutes 
(candy bar) we find that WTP and WTA value measures converge. In contrast, for a 
nonmarket good with no close substitutes (health risk), the value measures diverge 
and persist, even with repeated market exposure and full information on the nature 
of the good. We support the argument that the relative elasticity of substitution may 
well drive WTP-WTA value discrepancies. 
The next steps to be taken are twofold. First, researchers should replicate our 
experiment to test the robustness of our findings. More evidence to support or 
contradict our findings will be most welcome. Second, if Hanemann is correct, then 
researchers should concentrate on better understanding the nature of substitutability 
when we move outside the lab to field studies of nonmarket valuation. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Summary of experimental design 
EXPERIMENT 
PROCEDURE 
WILLINGNESS TO PAY WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT 
(WTP) (WTA) 
STAGE 1 Initial conditions Initial conditions 
- Market good - $3 income - $3 income 
- 5 trials - Small piece of candy - Regular-size brand-name 
- Vickrey second-price candy bar 
sealed-bid 
auction Auctioned pood Auctioned eood 
- 1 trial binding - Regular-size brand-name - Small piece of candy 
candy bar 
Value measure Value measure 
WTP (compensating surplus) WTA (equivalent surplus) to 
to exchange piece of candy exchange candy bar for small 
for candy bar piece of candy 
STAGE 2 Initial conditions Initial conditions 
- Nonmarket good - $15 income - $15 income 
- 20 trials - Typical food product with - Stringently screened food 
10 naive average health risk from 
10 experienced food-borne pathogen 
- 1 trial binding 
- Vickrey auction Auctioned good Auctioned Eood 
- 5 food-borne - Stringently screened food - Typical food product 
pathogens with 1 in 100 million 
• Campylobacter chance of health risk from 
• Salmonella food-borne pathogen 
• Staphylococcus 
aureus Value measure Value measure 
• Trichinella spiralis WTP (compensating surplus) WTA (equivalent surplus) to 
• Clostridium to exchange typical food exchange screened food 
petfiingens product for screened food product for typical food 
product product 
Table 2. Comparison of mean of WTP and WTA in candy bar experiment 
Ho; WTP = WTA 
H,: WTP < WTA 
Trial 1 Trial 2 T r i a l s  Trial 4 Trial 5 
WTP = 0.40 WTP = 038 WTP = 0.40 WTP = 0.40 WTP = 039 
Mean (036)' (0.20) (0.23) (0.19) (0.20) 
WTA = 0.51 WTA = 0.44 WTA = 039 WTA = 037 WTA = 037 
(035) (034) (035) (036) (0.35) 
t-test" -1.81" -1.19 0.22 0.55 0.57 
fZ-test" 4,047.5= 4,607 5,185' 5,342= 5,332.5"= 
Note: The sample size for the WTP experiments was n = 68; sample size for the WTA experiment 
was n = 74. 
'Sample standard deviations are in parentheses. 
"One-tail t-test. 
"Denotes rejection of Hq at the 1 percent significance level for the t-test and (/-test. 
"^Mann-Whitney £Atest. 
'Denotes rejection of Ho at the 5 percent significance level for the t-test and (/-test. 
Table 3. Comparison of WTP and WTA of five pathogens without eliminaiton 
Ho: WTP = WTA 
Pathogen H,: WTP < WTA 
/Probability] 
\ of Illness / 
Inexperienced One-Shot (1" Trial) Naive (T^-IO'" Trials) Informed (17"'-20"' Trials) 
Mean t-test* fZ-test*' Mean t-test tZ-test Mean t-test [/-test 
Campylobacter 
(1/125,143) 
WTP = 0.60 
(0.50)= 
WTA = 5.06 
(4.55) 
-3.65"' 141"* 
WTP = 0.71 
(0.43) 
WTA = 236 
(3.89) 
-IjT 201 
WTP = 0.86 
(038) 
WTA = 3.03 
(439) 
-1.84" 228 
Salmonella 
(1/137,000) 
WTP = 0.61 
(0.53) 
WTA = 8029 
(25957) 
-1.20 136 
WTP = 0.44 
(0.23) 
WTA = 8.01 
(25.46) 
-1.15 120" 
WTP = 0.55 
(0.25) 
WTA = 1.62 
(2.00) 
-2.04" 156" 
Stapylococcus 
aureus 
(1/173,694) 
WTP = 0.97 
(039) 
WTA = 5.55 
(7.86) 
-2.25"' 140" 
WTP = 0.92 
(032) 
WTA = 3.89 
(8.19) 
-1.40" 187 
WTP = 0.84 
(033) 
WTA = 56.2 
(205.87) 
-1.04 170.5 
Trichinella 
spiralis 
(1/2,628,000) 
WTP = 0.48 
(0.42) 
WTA = 12.8 
(24.80) 
-1.93" 115" 
WTP = 0.69 
(0.46) 
WTA = 1051 
(2536) 
-1.50' 155" 
WTP = 0.81 
(055) 
WTA = 18.0 
(50.82) 
-131 172.5 
Clostridium 
perfringsns 
(1/26,280,000) 
WTP = 0.64 
(0.63) 
WTA = 30.2 
(50.56) 
-2.26"' 111" 
WTP = 0.58 
(0.41) 
WTA = 1.98 
(137) 
-3.77" 109 J" 
WTP = 0.42 
(033) 
WTA = 2.21 
(1.70) 
-4.00" 91" 
Note: Sample sizes are as follows: Campfyobacter (WTP = 15, WTA = 14), Salmonella (WTP = 15, WTA = 15), Stapylococcus aureus 
(WTP = 12, WTA = 15), Trichinella spiralis (WTP = 13, WTA = 15), Clostridium perfnngens (WTP = 13, WTA = 1^. 
'One-tail t-test. 
•"Mann-Whitney {/-test. 
Sample standard deviations are in parentheses. 
""Denotes rejection of Hg at the 1 percent significance level for the t-test and (/-test. 
^Denotes rejection of at the 5 percent significance level for the t-test and CAtest. 
Table 4. Comparison of WTP and WTA of five pathogens with elimination 
Hg: WTP = WTA 
Pathogen H,: WTP < WTA 
/Probability] Inexperienced One-Shot (1" Trial) Naive (T^-IO'" Trials) Informed (lT''-20"' Trials) 
\ of Illness / 
Mean t-test* Mean t-test [/-test Mean t-test [/-test 
Campylobacter 
(1/125,143) 
WTP = 0.53 
(031)= 
WTA = 4.63 
(3.65) 
-3.87" 100" 
WTP = 0.71 
(036) 
WTA = 1.50 
(1.70) 
-1.58' 150 
WTP = 0.88 
(032) 
WTA = 2.29 
(3.02) 
-1.61' 177 
Salmonella 
(1/137,000) 
WTP = 0.55 
(038) 
WTA = 1572 
(5537) 
-1.02 96" 
WTP = 0.44 
(0.20) 
WTA = 1.49 
(0.92) 
-4.00" 91" 
WTP = 0.56 
(0.22) 
WTA = 1.23 
(1.25) 
-1.91" 114" 
Stapylococcus 
aureus 
(1/173,694) 
WTP = 1.02 
(0.26) 
WTA = 4.08 
(4.19) 
-2.63" 100 
WTP = 0.97 
(0.21) 
WTA = 3.12 
(7.81) 
-0.99 143' 
WTP = 0.91 
(0.23) 
WTA = 333 
(737) 
-1.19 1273 
Trichinella 
spiralis 
(1/2,628,000) 
WTP = 0.44 
(031) 
WTA = 7.08 
(5.93) 
-4.03" 78" 
WTP = 0.69 
(0.44) 
WTA = 4.43 
(5.79) 
-232" 110' 
WTP = 0.82 
(031) 
WTA = 5.42 
(7.33) 
-2.26" 1283 
Clostridium 
perfringens 
(1/26,280,000) 
WTP = 0.57 
(0.49) 
WTA = 19.4 
(1931) 
-3.47" 78" 
WTP = 0.60 
(038) 
WTA = 1.83 
(1.14) 
-3.67" 76.5" 
WTP = 0.43 
(032) 
WTA = 2.00 
(1.34) 
-4.11" 66" 
Note: Sample sizes are as follows: Campfyobacter (WTP = 13, WTA = 12), Salmonella (WTP = 13, WTA = 13), Stapylococcus aureus 
(WTP = 10, WTA = 13), Trichinella spiralis (WTP = 11, WTA = 13), Clostridium perfringens (WTP = 11, WTA = 13). 
'One-tail t-test. 
"Mann-Whitney [/-test. 
'Sample stand^d deviations are in parentheses. 
""Denotes rejection of H, at the 1 percent sigi^cance level for the t-test and (/-test. 
'Denotes rejection of Hg at the 5 percent significance level for the t-test and (/-test. 
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WTA 
WTA 
X 0 X , 
WTP 
(a)  Perfect  Substitutes 
WTP 
(b) imperfect  Substitutes 
Figure 1. Simple analytics of WTP-WTA divergence 
76 
AVERAGE WTP -)*- AVERAGE WTA 
Figure 2. Comparison of WTP and WTA: Candy bar experiments 
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Average WTP —WTP w/ elimination Average WTA -a- WTA w/ elimination 
Figure 3. WTP and WTA comparison: Campylobacter 
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10000: 
1000; 
100: 
0.1 
TRIAL 
• Average WTP —t— WTP w/ elimination Average WTA -H- WTA w/ elimination 
Figure 4. WTP and WTA comparison: Salmonella 
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100 
S 
0.1 
TRIAL 
* Average WTP —WTP w/ elimination Average WTA -a- WTA w/ elimination 
Figure 5. WTP and WTA comparison: Staphylococcus aureus 
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100; 
S 
0.1 
TRIAL 
Average WTP —WTP w/ elimination Average WTA -B- WTA w/ elimination 
Figure 6. WTP and WTA comparison: Trichinella spiralis 
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100: 
o Q 
0.1 
• Average IVTP -+— WTP w/ elimination Average WTA -G- WTA w/ elimination 
Figure 7, WTP and WTA comparison: Clostridium perfringens 
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APPENDIX 
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
#_ 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
You are about to participate in an experiment about decision making. Please follow the instructions 
carefully. The United States Department of Agriculture has provided funds for this research. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS 
In this experiment, you will be asked to decide how much you would be willing to pay for safer food. 
The experiment has two stages. 
Your starting income will be $3 in stage 1. Your income will be $15 for stage 2. Your take-home 
income will consist of your initial income ($3 + $15) minus the value of goods purchased. 
You will submit your bidding price on a recording card. Note only one of the trials in stage 1 will 
be binding and only one of the twenty trials in stage 2 will be binding. A number will be randomly selected 
to identify these binding trials. 
You cannot reveal your bids to any other participant. Any communication between bidders during 
a trial will result in an automatic penalty of $3. 
ABOUT YOU 
83 
1. Your sex : Male Female 
2. Your age : 19 or under 
2 0 - 2 4  
2 5 - 2 9  
3 0 - 3 4  
3 5 - 3 9  
4 0 - 4 4  
4 5 - 4 9  
50 or over 
3. How many individuals live in your household, including yourself? 
If you have children, how old are they? 
4. Do you eat red meat? Yes No 
Do you eat poultry? Yes No 
Do you eat fish? Yes No 
5. How often do you eat red meat, poultry, fish? 
Number of times you eat red meat per week? 
Number of tunes you eat poultry per week? 
Number of tunes you eat fish per week? 
6. Do you eat chicken sandwiches? Yes No 
7. Have you ever had food poisoning? 
Yes No Don't know 
8. If you became sick with a food-borne disease, how much money would you lose per day in addition to 
medical costs (i.e., lost wages)? 
dollars per day 
If you have sick leave benefits still indicate what your wage rate on this line. 
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CONSENT FORM 
#. 
You are about to participate in an experiment in willingness-to-pay for food safety. The purpose is to 
gain insight into what you are willing to pay for the guarantee that a food product will be safe. 
We need your signed consent if you are to act as a subject. Your participation in the experiment is 
completely voluntary and you may withdraw from the experiment at any time without prejudice to you. 
Results from the experiment will be strictly confidential. Any name associated with the experiment will be 
deleted upon completion of the experiment. 
If you consent to participate in the experiment, please sign the consent form below. 
I have read the consent form statement and agree to act as subject in the experiment, with the 
understanding that I can withdraw from the experiment at any time without prejudice to me. 
Signature 
i L 
Date 
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STAGE 1 # 
Step 1 : You own the candy free in front of you. Your initial income is $3. 
Step 2 : Let's say you are willing to pay $X for the piece of candy and $Y for a candy bar. The difference 
($Y - $X) is what you are willing to pay to upgrade your piece of candy into a candy bar. 
Please indicate your willingness to pay to trade the piece of candy for a candy bar. Do not state 
what you would pay for an entire candy bar. Only state the difference ($Y - $X) you are willing 
to pay. 
Step 3 : Please write your bid (difference) for the one candy bar on the recording card. The monitor will 
announce the highest bidder and display the price of the candy bar fsecond-highest bidding price") 
on the blackboard. 
Note : For example, if the highest bid was $a and the second-highest bid was $3, the highest bidder 
would receive the candy bar and must pay $J3. 
Step 4 : There will be five trials. 
Step 5 : Only one trial will be binding. After the five trials, a number will be randomly selected to 
determine which trial is binding. The highest bidder of that trial will exchange the piece of candy 
for the candy bar and must pay the displayed price (i.e., the second-highest bid\ 
Note ; In the event that there is a tie for the highest bid, those participants will be asked to bid again. 
I. 
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Questions 
Please answer the following questions, which are designed to help you understand stage 1. Do not 
hesitate to ask the researchers if you have questions. 
1. Suppose that person A is the highest bidder in the first trial, person B is the highest bidder in third 
trial, and person C is the highest bidder in fifth trial. If, after five trials are finished, we randomly 
select the third trial, then who will purchase the candy bar? 
2. If your $a bid is the highest in the third trial, and the second-highest bid is $J3, what price will you pay 
for the candy bar? 
$ 
3. If your bid is not the highest in the third trial, which is randomly selected, how much should you pay 
for the piece of candy? 
$ 
87 
STAGE 2 #. 
Step 1 : There are two types of food. The features of each are described below. 
Test Product Stringently Screened 
This food has a typical chance of being 
contaminated with the food-borne 
pathogen Salmonella; i.e., it is purchased 
from a local source. 
This food has been subjected to stringent 
screening for Salmonella. There is a 1 in 
100.000.000 chance of getting 
salmonellosis from consuming this food. 
Step 2 ; You own a test product sandwich free in front of you. Everyone has the same sandwich. You also 
have initial income, $15. 
Step 3 : Let's say you willing to pay $X for the test product sandwich and $Y for the stringently screened 
sandwich. The difference ($Y - $X) is what you are willing to pay to reduce the risk of illness 
from the food-borne pathogens. 
Please indicate your willingness to pay to reduce the risk of illness. Do not state what you would 
pay for the entire stringently screened sandwich. Only state the difference ($Y - $X) you are 
willing to pay. 
The highest bidder will upgrade his or her test product sandwich for the stringently screened 
sandwich. He or she will pay the second-highest bidder's price. 
Step 4 : There will be twenty trials. 
Step 5 : After all twenty trials are complete, we will randomly select one binding trial to determine who 
buys the stringently screened food. 
Note : The sandwich has to be eaten to leave with the take-home income. 
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Questions 
Please answer the following questions, which are designed to help you understand stage 2. Do not 
hesitate to ask the researchers if you have questions. 
1. There are twenty bidding trials. If person A is the highest bidder in the first trial, person B is the 
highest bidder in the eighteenth trial, and the eighteenth trial is selected, then who will receive the 
stringently screened food? 
2. If your $a bid is the highest in the eighteenth trial, and the second highest bid is $3, what price will 
you pay for the stringently screened food? $ 
NOTE : Please answer the questions below. 
1. What do you think is the chance of becoming ill from Salmonella, given that you eat an average 
amount of typical food products in the United States over one vear? 
Answer: chance out of 1 million people 
2. What do you think are the important sources of the food-borne pathogen. Salmonella, in the 
United States? 
Please list the type of food items. 
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Information for Trials 11-20 
Test Product 
If you eat this food, there is a 1 in 137.000 
chance that you will become ill from 
Salmonella. 
Stringently Screened 
This food has been subjected to stringent 
screening for Salmonella. There is a 1 in 
100.000.000 chance of getting 
Salmonellosis from consuming this food. 
Description of Salmonellosis : 
Symptoms are those of a mild "flu-like" intestinal disease of short duration with abdominal pains, 
nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. The actual individual chance of infection of salmonellosis is 1 in 
125 annually. Of those individuals who get sick, 1 individual out of 1,000 will die annually. The 
average cost for medical expenses and productivity losses from a mild case of salmonellosis is $220. 
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AGREEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING FORM 
#. 
The risks you took in eating this food are identical to those you take when eating meals you prepare 
at home or purchase when eating out. 
Please sign below to indicate that you have read and understood the above announcement. 
Signature 
i L 
Date 
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SECTION III. 
CONSUMERS WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR SAFER PORK PRODUCTS 
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INTRODUCTION 
Approximately 26 percent of the average U.S. consmner's weekly food-at-home 
expenditure is for meat, poultry, fish, and eggs. Beef accounts for 33 percent, and 
pork, the second-ranking item, accounts for 19 percent of the weekly meat, poultry, 
fish, and egg expenditure (USDA 1991). Average annual pork consumption was 48.4 
pounds in 1989, which represents one-fourth of total U.S. meat, poultry, and fish 
consumption (USDA 1991). 
During the 1980s, per capita beef consumption gradually decreased and pork 
consumption was stable. Today's consumers are demanding leaner meat products, 
and the pork industry's effort to provide leaner pork products has helped maintain 
consumption levels. Additionally, programs for regulating the use of antibiotics in 
hog feeds and the use of nitrites in processing pork have aided in enhancing pork 
quality. 
Two examples of food-borne illnesses transferred through pork products are 
salmonellosis and trichinosis. Contamination of pork products leads to human illness, 
economic loss to society, and perceived quality problems by consumers. Programs for 
inspection and reduction of Trichinella spiralis has improved the safety of pork 
products. Annually, approximately two million cases of Salmonellosis (Bennett et al. 
1987) and 70 percent of the trichinosis cases are associated with eating inadequately 
cooked or treated pork products (CDC 1990). This pattern has led consumers to 
overcook pork, which has significantly reduced palatability and deterred demand. 
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An active policy to improve pork safety would permit consumption of a medium-rare 
pork chop, a product likely preferred by consumers (Hayenga et al. 1985). Consumer 
demand for pork products can be enhanced by providing products with improved 
quality and safety. 
Food-borne illnesses, such as salmonellosis and trichinosis, cause large social 
and economic losses annually. These costs include medical treatment costs, 
productivity loss, pain and suffering of affected individuals, food industry losses, and 
losses within the public health sector (Roberts and van Ravenswaay 1989). Estimated 
losses are generally based on these direct individual losses (Roberts 1989) and likely 
represent an underestimation of the true economic costs. Morbidity costs such as 
consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce their chance of becoming sick from a 
food-borne sickness have been excluded. 
The primary focus of this study is to evaluate consumers' WTP for safer food 
and reduced morbidity. The value of consumers' WTP to avoid morbidity or 
mortality from food-borne illness caused by pathogenic microorganisms such as 
Salmonella and Trichinella spiralis are estimated. Additionally, consumer perceptions 
of the level of food safety are evaluated. Consumer responses or their WTP for 
improved food safety are compared using two approaches. The first is the naive 
response based on prior subjective information. The second is the consumer's WTP 
after being provided of information on the actual probability of food-related sickness. 
Information on consumers' WTP for food safety are obtained through a 
nonhypothetical laboratory experimental approach. Participants were provided the 
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opportunity to eat an ordinary meat product (maybe contaminated) free of charge or 
they could bid by auction for a product that was guaranteed to be free of Salmonella 
or Trichinella spiralis. A Vickrey second-price sealed-bid auction was used to elicit 
consumers' WTP for reduced pathogen risks. The Vickrey auction has been shown to 
accurately reveal preferences for other goods (see Coursey 1987). 
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EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The consumers' WTP was obtained through observing the preference or the 
value of the unpriced goods within Vickrey's (1961) second-price sealed-bid auction 
setting. As long as the individual prefers more money to less, the laboratory 
experiment can elicit the consumer values of the unpriced goods. There are two 
stages in the experiment. Stage 1 is an exercise to familiarize the subjects with the 
auction procedure by usin^); Viclcrey's second-price sealed-bid auction for a highly 
familiar food item for which the subjects have some idea of value. In Stage 2, $15 
was provided as income to each participant. Two food-borne pathogens were 
considered in two separate experimental sessions. Each participant was involved with 
one food-borne pathogen. Salmonella or Trichinella spiralis. At the beginning of 
Stage 2, two types of food items were shown to the subjects and a description was 
provided for each item. One item was the test product, purchased from a local 
source with a typical chance of being contaminated with Salmonella or Trichinella 
spiralis. This product was provided free to eveiy participant. The other food product 
was stringently screened for Salmonella or Trichinella spiralis and had a low chance 
(one in 100 million) of causing salmonellosis or trichinosis. 
Participants were asked the maximum they were willing to pay to upgrade the 
test product for the food product that had been stringently screened for pathogens. 
There were twenty trials in each experiment. For each trial, the participants' 
recording cards were collected by the monitor, and the monitor announced the 
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highest bidder and displayed the price of WTP for the screened food (second-highest 
bidding price) as public information on the blackboard. Repeating the auction over 
twenty trials provided a learning period for the participants, allowing them to 
converge to their true WTP value. To control for possible wealth effects, subjects 
were made fully aware that only one of the twenty trials was binding. The binding 
trial was randomly selected by a Monte Carlo number generator after completion of 
all twenty trials. 
The first ten "naive" trials were conducted with the participants making bids 
based on their prior risk perceptions of salmonellosis (or trichinosis). After the tenth 
trial, the monitor provided additional information about the actual chance of 
contracting salmonellosis (trichinosis). There is a one in 137,000 chance of infection 
of Salmonella (one in 2,628,000 for Trichinella spiralis) from one-time consumption of 
the typical product. The actual individual chance of infection annually from 
Salmonella is one in 125 (one in 2,400 for Trichinella spiralis), and of those who 
contract salmonellosis, one in 1,000 (for trichinosis, one in 100) will die annually 
(Bennett et al. 1987). The symptoms (Acha and Szyfres 1980) and average medical 
cost ($220) of a mild case of salmonellosis ($2,485 for trichinosis) (Roberts 1989) 
were also provided. Participants then bid in ten informed trials to complete the 
experiment. After twenty trials, a computer randomly selected one binding trial to 
decide who purchased the screened food. The highest bidder paid the displayed 
second-highest bidding price and then ate the screened food. The highest bidder's 
take-home income was the $15 minus the price paid for the screened food. The 
other bidders ate the test product and had a take-home income of $15. The 
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participants had to eat the food item to leave the experiment with the take-home 
income. 
Fifteen students at Iowa State University (ISU) participated in each 
experiment. Each experiment had a different set of students. Experiments were 
conducted in the ISU meat testing laboratory with modern kitchen facilities. The 
ISU lab conducts food tasting experiments on a regular basis and is actively involved 
in all aspects of meat processing and handling, thereby providing a unique setting for 
our experiment. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Figure 1 provides the results for the experiments. The first trial, an 
inexperienced one-shot bid, was analogous to the survey valuation method. The 
average WTP in the first trial was 61 cents for the Salmonella experiment and 48 
cents for the Trichinella spiralis experiment. The average WTP of trials 7 through 10 
with subjects' naive information was 44 cents for the Salmonella experiment, and 69 
cents for the Trichinella spiralis experiment, which was 17 cents lower and 21 cents 
higher than the average inexperienced first bid, respectively. Subjects in the 
Salmonella experiment had a lower WTP bid with repeated market-like exposure; 
however, in the Trichinella spiralis experiment, the subjects' naive bid was increased 
by 44 percent with market exposure. 
Subjects increased their WTP value at trial 11 in both experiments. Their 
prior subjective probability of becoming ill from eating a year's supply of the typical 
food product was one in 212,000 for Salmonella and one in 6,186,440 for Trichinella 
spiralis, both of which were lower than the actual probability. For trials 17 through 
20, the mean WTP was 55 cents for Salmonella, which was 24 percent greater than 
the average WTP for trials 7 through 10. For Trichinella spiralis, the informed bid 
was 81 cents, which was 16 percent greater than the average WTP of trials 7 through 
10 (69 cents). 
Table 1 compares the mean of trials 7 through 10 with the mean of trials 17 
through 20. The t-test and signed-rank test indicate that the WTP differences 
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between naive and experienced bids for Salmonella and Trichinella spiralis were 
statistically significant at the 1 percent and 10 percent significance level, respectively. 
Full information and repeated exposure to the auction market had an impact on 
average WTP values. 
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CONCLUSION 
Overall, the results indicate that the subjects were willing to pay more for the 
safer food product than for the typical food product. In the first trial, which is 
equivalent to a field survey method, subjects bid higher WIP values than the bid with 
repeated market exposure for Salmonella and less for Trichinella spiralis. With naive 
information, bids converged to a lower WTP value for Salmonella and a higher value 
for Trichinella spiralis. Subjects evaluated their prior subjective probability of illness 
as lower than the actual level. Therefore, with full information, their bids increased 
from the level of their naive bid. 
This study provides additional information for approximating the full economic 
costs of food-borne illness and expands the capability of providing a cost-benefit 
analysis of food safety policies. The WTP approach opens the avenue for more 
accurately estimating total economic costs of food-borne illness. Potential benefits of 
alternative methods for reducing food-bome infectious disease, such as irradiation 
treatment for raw pork, can be better estimated. 
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TABLE AND FIGURE 
Table 1. Summary statistics of experiments 
Pathogen Mean vnllingness to pay 
-
/Probability 
I of Illness / Inexperienced 
(1" trial) 
Naive 
(T'-IO'" trials) 
Informed 
(17th.2o"' trials) 
Salmonella 
(1/137,000) 
0.6120 
(0.5331)* 
0.4448 
(0.2278) 
0.5523 
(0.2534) 
Trichinella 
spiralis 
(1/2,628,000) 
0.4808 
(0.4161) 
0.6942 
(0.4611) 
0.8069 
(0.5542) 
Hg: WTP"-" = WTP"" 
H,: WTP"-" > WTP™ 
Mean difference** t-test Signed-rank test 
Salmonella 
(1/137,000) 
0.1075 
(0.1008) 
4.1286"= 39= 
Trichinella 
spiralis 
(1/2,628,000) 
0.1127 
(02552) 
1.5920" 19"" 
Note: The sample size of Salmonella experiment was n = 15; sample size of Trichinella spiralis experiment was 
n = 13. 
'Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
""Represents the mean difference between average WTP in trials 17 through 20 and average WTP in trials 7 
through 10. 
"Denotes rejection of HQ at the 1 percent significance level for both t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
"'Denotes rejection of HQ at the 10 percent significance level for both t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
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0.85 
0.8 
0.75 
0.7 
0.65 
0.6 
0.55 
0.5 
0.45 
0.4 
TRIAL 
1 SalmondkL —'— Tridiimàla s. 
Figure 1. Comparison of average WTP: Salmonella and Trichinella spiralis 
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GENERAL SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Food safety issues are analyzed in terms of the economic costs of food-borne 
illness. A willingness to pay (WTP) value of the safer food and willingness to accept 
(WTA) value of bearing additional food-borne risks are estimated. A non-
hypothetical laboratory experimental design was developed for estimating the WTP 
and WTA measures of safer food using the Vickrey's second-price sealed-bid auction 
mechanism. 
Previous studies have estimated the economic cost of food-borne illness based 
only on direct individual costs, such as productivity losses, and hospitalization costs. 
These measures underestimate the true economic costs. This study included the cost 
of morbidity which was represented by WTP value of not having a food-borne illness 
and the WTA value of the compensation required for bearing the food-bome risks. 
These estimates represent a comprehensive economic costs of food-borne illness and 
are close to the upper bound of the measures among the previous cost estimates. 
This research supports several conclusions about consumers behavior. First, full 
information of the food-borne illness and repeated market-like auction mechanism 
has an impact on participants' average WTP and WTA bids. Second, there exists a 
disparity between the nonmarket good (health) and wealth with given positive income 
elasticity and small elasticity of substitution. Third, the results of the pathogen 
specific experiment could not be compared in terms of the full economic costs (WTP) 
of the specific pathogens. The consumers responded to the presence of the food-
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borne risks in general rather than the risk level of the specific food-borne pathogens. 
Fourth, this research does show that the WTP value for the safer food is surprisingly 
large-this may explain the current emphasis on food safety in the United States. 
This study provides additional information on the full economic costs of food-
borne illness and expands the capability of providing cost-benefits analysis of food 
safety policies. The nonhypothetical laboratory experiment method used in this study 
is shown to be a useful method to address the food safety issues. 
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